We prove the following surprising property of Heyting's intuitionistic propositional calculus, IpC. Consider the collection of formulas, , built up from propositional variables (p; q; r; : : :) and falsity (?) using conjunction (^), disjunction (_) and implication (!). Write` to indicate that such a formula is intuitionistically valid. We show that for each variable p and formula there exists a formula A p (eectively computable from ), containing only variables not equal to p which occur in , and such that for all formulas not involving p,` !A p if and only if` !. Consequently quantication over propositional variables can be modelled in IpC, and there is an interpretation of the second order propositional calculus, IpC 2 , in IpC which restricts to the identity on rst order propositions.
Introduction
This paper establishes a new and rather surprising property of Heyting's intuitionistic propositional calculus, IpC. We show that quantication over propositional variables can be modelled in IpC, and hence that there is an interpretation of the second order propositional calculus, IpC 2 , in IpC which restricts to the identity on rst order propositions. In order to state this result more precisely, we briey recall the syntax and proof theory of rst and second order intuitionistic propositional logic.
We will take the rst order propositions, , to be given by the following grammar ::= p j ? j ^ 0 j _ 0 j ! 0 where p ranges over a set of propositional variables. Negation, truth and biimplication can be dened in the usual way: Table 1 gives a collection of natural deduction style rules for IpC. The premisses and conclusion of each rule are sequents, 0 ) , which we take to be specied by a nite multiset (unordered list) of rst order propositions, 0, and a single rst order proposition . The use of multisets rather than sets in sequents will be important when we consider the`size' of sequents in section 2. For the moment, we note that since the order of formulas in 0 is immaterial, an explicit structural rule of Exchange is not needed. As usual, we identify formulas with one-element multisets, and write 01 for the union of two multisets 0 and 1. We will write IpC`0 ) to indicate that the sequent is provable using the rules in Table 1 . The new property of IpC which we establish here is: Theorem 1 Given a propositional variable p, for each rst order proposition there is a rst order proposition A p , containing only variables not equal to p which occur in , and satisfying:
(i) If IpC`0 ) , then IpC`0 ) A p , provided p does not occur in 0.
(ii) If IpC`0 ) A p , then for all , IpC`0 ) [ =p] (where [ =p] denotes the result of substituting for p throughout ). This theorem will be proved in section 2 using proof-theoretic methods. The key tool is the use of a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for IpC for which there is a well-founded relation on sequents making the hypotheses of each rule of the calculus less than its conclusion. (The rst order proposition A p will be dened by recursion over this well-founded relation.) The particular sequent calculus we use is that given (independently) by Hudelmaier [6] and Dyckho [4] ; its implicational part (the most important part) also occurs in the work of Lincoln, Scedrov and Shankar [8] . In fact, essentially similar renements of the sequent calculus for IpC were developed by the Russian school of Proof Theory some time ago|see Vorob'ev [13] .
Remark 2 It is perhaps worth pointing out that the analogue of Theorem 1 for classical logic is rather trivially true, since there we may take A p to be [>=p]^[?=p].
The existence of rst order propositions A p satisfying Theorem 1 enables one to interpret in IpC the second order intuitionistic propositional logic, IpC 2 , a logic which extends IpC with quantication over propositional variables. As is well known, in this logic implication and universal quantication suce to dene the other connectives and existential quantication|see [11] . However, we will take the second order propositions to be given by the grammar
in order that they be a superset of the rst order propositions. The natural deduction rules for 8p are given in Table 2 . Occurrences of p in become bound in 8p; all other types of occurrence of variables are free. We will write IpC 2`0 ) to indicate that a sequent of second order propositions can be proved using the rules in Tables 1 and 2 . In section 3 we use Theorem 1 to dene a translation of second order propositions, , into rst order ones, 3 . The translation has the following properties:
(i) If IpC 2`0 ) , then IpC`0 3 ) 3 (where 0 3 indicates the translation applied elementwise to the multiset 0).
(ii) p 3 = p, ? 3 = ?, (# ) 3 = 3 # 3 (for # =^; _; !), and hence in particular 3 = for all rst order propositions . See Proposition 9 below for more details. An immediate corollary of the existence of such an interpretation is a strengthening of the usual Interpolation Theorem for IpC. Recall that the latter says that given rst order propositions and for which ) is provable in IpC, there is some rst order proposition containing only variables common to both and , and for which both ) and ) are provable. Here we establish (Proposition 11) that the collection of such interpolant propositions is not merely non-empty but in fact contains least and greatest elements (with respect to the provability ordering for IpC). The results presented in this paper have had a rather long gestation period. Some ten or so years ago I tried to prove the negation of Theorem 1 in connection with the higher order analogue of Proposition 18|the question whether any Heyting algebra can appear as the algebra of truth-values of an elementary topos. I established that the free Heyting algebra on a countable innity of generators does not so appear provided the property of IpC given in Theorem 1 does not hold. It seemed likely to me (and to others to whom I posed the question) that a rst order proposition could be found for which A p does not exist (although I could not nd one!), thus settling the original question about toposes and Heyting algebras in the negative. That Theorem 1 is true is quite a surprise to me. Unfortunately, it appears that not all the results for second order logic reported here generalize to the setting of higher order logic. Whilst it is the case that Theorem 1 remains true if IpC is replaced by a quantier-free fragment of intuitionistic higher order logic, the substitution property of Lemma 8 fails (so that one does not get an interpretation of full higher order logic in its quantierfree fragment). It remains an open question whether every Heyting algebra can be the Lindenbaum algebra of a theory in intuitionistic higher order logic. Acknowledgement I would like to thank R. Dyckho for bringing to my attention the particular sequent calculus for IpC used in this paper. I would also like to thank him, A. Scedrov and G. Mints for elucidating its history.
( 3 where p is any propositional variable) Our proof will use the methods of Proof Theory.
To be more precise, we will employ a certain renement of the cut-free Gentzen sequent calculus for IpC and we begin by explaining that. Table 3 contains a fairly standard cut-free sequent calculus for IpC. This formulation of the sequent calculus has essential uses of the structural rules (Weaken) and (Contract) of Table 1 built in implicitly: weakening is built in via the (Atom) axiom, and an essential use of contraction is built in to the rule (!)) by repeating the active proposition ! in the rst premiss of the rule. We refer the reader to [3, Part 1,x3] for a proof of the fact that (Weaken), (Contract), (Id) and the Cut Rule 0 ) 1 ) (Cut) 01 ) are all derivable from the rules in Table 3 , and hence that these rules determine the same provable sequents as do those in Table 1 .
Note that (!)) is the only rule in Table 3 which fails to have the property that its premisses are structurally simpler than its conclusion. Following Dyckho [4] and Hudelmaier [6] , we can overcome this defect by replacing (!)) by
( 3 where p is any propositional variable) Table 4 : Replacements for (!)) the four rules shown in Table 4 . The new rules correspond to the possible forms of the antecedent of the introduced implication|except that a separate rule is not needed for the case when the antecedent is ? (since the appropriate rule is an instance of weakening). We will refer to the system of rules obtained from Table 3 by relacing (!)) by the rules in Table 4 as LJ 3 . Clearly any sequent provable in LJ 3 is intuitionistically valid, since the rules in Table 4 are all derivable in IpC; the converse is also true, so that one has: Theorem 3 IpC`0 ) if and only if the sequent is provable in LJ 3 We refer the reader to [4, Theorem 1] for a proof of this result. holds if and only if 1 = 1 1 1 2 and 0 = 1 1 0 2 , for some 1 1 , 1 2 and 0 2 with 1 2 non-empty and such that for all 2 0 2 there exists 2 1 2 with . As shown in [2] , this relation between multisets is well-founded because the original relation on propositions is.
Finally, dene a well-founded relation on sequents by declaring (0 ) ) (1 ) ) to hold just in case 0 1 . Note that each rule in LJ 3 has the property that a (premiss,conclusion)-pair lies in this relation between sequents.
We turn now to the proof of Theorem 1. Recall that in second order intuitionistic propositional logic, existentially quantied propositions, 9p, are denable in terms of 8 and !: 9p def = 8q(8p( ! q) ! q) (where q is not free in ). It follows that the existence of the rst order propositions A p for all , with properties as in Theorem 1, entails the existence of rst order propositions E p which model the existentially quantied proposition 9p. In fact to prove the theorem, we will need to dene A p and E p simultaneously via mutual recursion. Moreover, we will need to give the denitions for multisets of formulas rather than for single formulas , in order to utilize LJ (ii) (a) Hence the sequent obtained from this one by substituting a proposition for p throughout, is also provable; but by 5(i)(b) p 6 2 V ar(A p ), so the result of such a substitution is IpC`A p ) [ =p] . So IpC`0 ) [ =p] holds whenever IpC`0 ) A p does, as required.
Remark 6 Properties (i)(a), (ii)(a) and (iii)(a) together imply that E p (1) acts like the existentially quantied formula 9p(^1) (where^1 denotes the conjunction of the formulas in 1). However, properties (i)(b), (ii)(a), (ii)(b) and (iii)(b) imply that it is E p (1) ! A p (1; ), rather than just A p (1; ), which acts like the universally quantied formula 8p(^1 ! ). This is because of the appearance of E p (1) in (iii)(b)|a complication which is needed to carry through the proof of (iii). This proof proceeds by induction on the structure of the proof of 01 ) in LJ 3 , and it is the case where the proof ends with the active formula an implication contained in 0 which requires us to prove (iii)(b) rather than IpC`0 ) A p (1; ).
The rest of this section will be devoted to the proof of Proposition 5.
The formulas E p (1) and A p (1; ) are dened simultaneously by -induction on 1 (where is the well-founded relation of Denition 4). At each stage, we dene E p (1) as the conjunction of a nite set of formulas E p (1) and A p (1; ) as the disjunction of a nite set of formulas A p (1; ):
The elements of the nite sets E p (1) and A p (1; ) are given by , with one case for each proof rule: Case (Atom): So is a propositional variable and is an element of 01, i.e. 2 0 or 2 1. We will split the argument into two subcases according to whether is the variable p or not. Subcase = p: In this case we just have to check that (b) holds for 01 ) .
Since p 6 2 0, we must have 1 = 1 0 p. Then case (A10) of Table 5 gives IpC`> ) A p (1 0 p; p), from which (b) follows.
Subcase 6 = p : We know that either 2 0 or 2 1. In the rst case (a) holds for 01 ) by (Atom), and (b) follows from (a) because by case (A9) of Table 5 , IpC` ) A p (1; ). On the other hand, if 2 1, say 1 = 1 0 , case (E1) of Table 5 gives IpC`E p (1 0 ) ) E p (1 0 )^, from which (a) for 01 ) follows; and as before (b) follows from (a) by case (A9). for i = 1; 2, from which (a) for 01 ) follows.
1 matches But by case (A11) of Table 5 IpC`A p (1; 1 )^A p (1; 2 ) ) A p (1; ) So (b) for 01 ) follows.
Case (^)): Subcase: 0 = 0 0 ( 1^2 ), IpC`0 0 1 2 1 ) , and (a) and (b) hold for this sequent by induction hypothesis. Hence (a) and (b) hold for 01 ) by an application of (^)).
Subcase: 1 = 1 0 ( 1^2 ), IpC`01 0 1 2 ) , and (a) and (b) hold for this sequent by induction hypothesis. From this it follows that (a) and (b) hold for 01 ) since by cases (E2) and (A2) of Table 5 we have But by case (E3) of Table 5 IpC`E p (1) ) E p (1 But by case (A3) of Table 5 IpC`(E p (1 )) ) by an application of (!) 1 ). But by case (E4) of Table 5 But by case (E5) of Table 5 we also have
IpC`E p (1) But by cases (E1) and (E4) of Table 5 Case (!) 2 ): This case is analogous to that for (^)), using cases (E6) and (A6) of Table 5 . Case (!) 3 ): This case is analogous to that for (^)), using cases (E7) and (A7) of Table 5 . Case (!) 4 
when p 6 2 V ar()|in which case combining (2), (4) and case (E8) of Table 5 we have that (a) holds for 01 ) . For (b), from (2) we get
and this together with (3) and case (E8) of Table 5 yield
Then (5), (6) and case (A8) of Table 5 together give that (b) holds for 01 ) .
This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
Interpreting IpC 2 in IpC
Using the propositions A p dened in the previous section, we can translate second order propositions into rst order ones. Denition 7 For each second order proposition , dene a rst order proposition, 3 , by induction on the structure of as follows:
In order to see that this translation sends IpC 2 -provable sequents to IpCprovable ones, we need to establish a crucial property of the mapping 7 ! A p , namely that it commutes with substitution. It is a peculiarity of second order logic (compared with third, or higher, order logic) that this follows automatically from the properties of A p established in Theorem 1 Lemma 8 Given distinct propositional variables p; q, and rst order propositions and with p; q 6 To prove the converse, we use the following congruence property of $ in IpC:
From part (ii) of Theorem 1 we have (ii) If is a rst order proposition then 3 = .
Thus ( ) 3 gives an interpretation of IpC 2 into IpC which restricts to the identity on rst order propositions.
Proof Part (i) is proved by induction on the structure of the proof of 0 ) from the rules in Tables 1 and 2 . The induction step for rule (8Intr) uses part (i) of Theorem 1. The induction step for rule (8Elim) uses part (ii) of the theorem in conjunction with Lemma 8.
Part (ii) is immediate from the denition of ( ) 3 .
3
Since IpC-provability is decidable whereas IpC 2 -provability is not (see [5] , for example), the interpretation ( ) 3 cannot be conservative. Here is an interesting example of an unprovable second order proposition whose interpretation is provable. The construction of A p according to Second order intuitionistic propositional logic has an interpolation property which is a trivial consequence of quantication over propositions. Using the interpretation ( ) 3 we can transfer this to a non-trivial interpolation property for IpC which strengthens the usual Interpolation Theorem for this logic. properties (i) and (ii) in Proposition 9 applied to the above sequents imply that " and are indeed interpolants for (; ) in IpC. Moreover, if is any other rst order interpolant, from IpC` ) we get IpC 2` ) and hence IpC 2` ) 8r 1 1 1 1 8r w (since r 1 ; : : : ; r w 6 2 V ar()); and then on applying ( ) 3 we get IpC` ) . Similarly, IpC` ) implies IpC`" ) .
4 Heyting Algebra Applications
Recall that a Heyting algebra, H, is a (distributive) lattice in which every pair of elements h; h 0 2 H possesses a relative pseudocomplement, h ! h 0 (the greatest element whose meet with h lies underneath h 0 in the ordering on H). A morphism of Heyting algebras is a function preserving all nite meets, nite joins and relative pseudocomplements. We will denote by Heyt the category of Heyting algebras and morphisms. As their name suggests, Heyting algebras are the models of an algebraic theory: see for example Balbes and Dwinger [1, Chapter IX] for an equational presentation and further information on the theory of Heyting algebras.
The relationship between Heyting algebras and intuitionistic logic is exactly analagous to that between Boolean algebras and classical logic. In particular, there is a correspondence between Heyting algebras and rst order intuitionistic propositional theories, induced by the process of forming the Lindenbaum algebra of a theory. Thus for each set G, let FhGi denote the set of rst order propositions built up from the elements of G regarded as propositional variables. Given a subset R FhGi, let 
-U ! (where # =^, _, or !). In particular, when contains no free variables we can takep to be empty and obtain a global element [ [] ] 2 C (1; U) of U for each closed second order proposition . We will call the Heyting algebra C (1; U) the algebra of truth-values of the model (C; U).
Say that (C; U) satises such a closed proposition and write (C; U) j= if [ [] ] is the top element of C (1; U). This notion of satisfaction is sound for provability in IpC 2 : if IpC 2`; ) then (C; U) j= . Conversely, it is not hard to prove (by a term model construction) that it is also complete: IpC 2`; ) holds if is satised by all (C; U).
Returning now to Theorem 13, given H 2 Heyt, let C be the opposite of the full subcategory of H=Heyt consisting of the nitely generated free objects. More concretely, we can take the objects of C to be nite ordinals, [n] , and the morphisms [n] - [m] to be m-tuples of elements of the polynomial Heyting algebra in n indeterminates, H[X 1 ; : : : ; X n ]. Composition is given by substitution and the identity on [n] is (X 1 ; : : : ; X n ). Lawvere's categorical treatment of algebraic theories (see [7] , for example) tells us that C (has nite products and) contains the generic model of the algebraic theory of`Heyting algebras equipped with a morphism from H'. In particular, C does contain a Heyting algebra object, namely Proposition 18 Given a Heyting algebra H, the algebraic theory of`Heyting algebras equipped with a morphism from H' has the property that its generic model U has internal U-indexed meets, and hence provides a model of second order intuitionistic propositional logic. Since the algebra of truth-values of this model is just H, we conclude that every Heyting algebra appears as the algebra of truth-values of some model of IpC 2 .
3
There is a correspondence between instances of the notion of model of IpC 2 as we have dened it, and IpC 2 -theories. (By such a theory we mean a suitable language together with a collection of axioms|second order propositions over the language.) Under this correspondence, the algebra of truth-values of a model is identied with the Lindenbaum algebra of the theory (i.e. the collection of closed second order propositions over the given language, quotiented by provability in IpC 2 augmented with the given axioms). Consequently, Proposition 18 implies:
Every Heyting algebra is the Lindenbaum algebra of some IpC 2 -theory.
In fact one can see this without recourse to the correspondence between models and theories, using the interpretation of IpC 2 into IpC developed in section 3. For given a Heyting algebra H, choose a presentation for it as H = FhG; Ri. Then the set of second order propositions over G f j IpC`0 ) 3 , for some nite 0 Rg determines an IpC 2 -theory over G whose Lindenbaum algebra is isomorphic to FhG; Ri (the isomorphism being induced by ( ) 3 ).
